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ABSTRACT
The IEEE 802.15.4 has attracted time-critical applications in wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) because of its beacon-enabled mode and guaranteed timeslots (GTSs). However,
the GTS scheme's security still leave the 802.15.4 MAC vulnerable to attacks. Further, the
existing techniques in the literature for securing 802.15.4 either focus on non beacon-enabled
802.15.4 or cannot defend against insider attacks for beacon-enabled 802.15.4. In this thesis,
we illustrate this by demonstrating attacks on the availability and integrity of the beacon-
enabled 802.15.4. To proof the attacks, we implement the attacks using Tmote Sky motes
for a malicious node along with regular nodes. We show that the malicious node can freely
exploit the beacon frames to compromise the integrity and availability of the network. For
the defense, we present beacon-enabled MiniSec (BCN-MiniSec) and analyze its cost.
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1Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have emerged quickly and attracted a number of di-
verse applications. The use of these applications ranges from residential to government. For
example, AlertMe home monitoring [1] is a residential system that enables secure indoor
and outdoor home environment monitoring with simple contact and passive infrared (PIR)
sensors. If AlertMe detects intruders, it immediately reports the intrusion to the homeowner.
The military is also using WSNs to detect an adversary's behavior and location. For exam-
ple, seismic sensors can be used to detect the movement of heavy artillery (e.g., tanks) in
the battleeld. In either case, not receiving information about the environment in a time-
sensitive manner can have signicant consequences. To provide support for time-sensitive
communication, the IEEE 802.15.4 standard provides a beacon-enabled mode. Unlike non
beacon-enabled mode, the beacon-enabled mode in a 802.15.4 network employs a few end
device nodes and a centralized node (i.e., personal area network (PAN) coordinator) which
broadcasts beacons to synchronize the nodes in the network, manages guaranteed timeslots
(GTS) (de)allocation requests from the nodes, and assigns dedicated slots for transmissions
of the nodes through beacons. The beacon broadcast and GTS management scheme are
the most critical parts of real-time delivery of time-sensitive data during the contention
free period (CFP) [2{7]. Many researchers have focused on improving the performance or
energy eciency of beacon-enabled 802.15.4 MAC and the use of its GTS scheme. For ex-
ample, the IPP-HURRY research group has analyzed the delay bound of GTS allocations
to maximize the throughput of each GTS allocation for real-time sensor networks [3, 4]. In
2addition, in [5] the authors present a case study of Siemens Industry Automation Division
that requires real-time delivery of short alarms/messages. The case study evaluates GTS
allocation to maximize low latency of its scheme. Although there has been a signicant em-
phasis on improving the performance of beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks, there has been
little work on securing them. This is signicant, given that the GTS management scheme of
the PAN coordinator does not verify the ID of each node that requests GTSs. Further the
nodes in the network do not validate the PAN coordinator that broadcasts beacons. There-
fore, an inside attacker can easily compromise the guaranteed data transmissions from the
time-sensitive applications in the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network by either impersonating
legitimate nodes (existing in the PAN or not) or the PAN coordinator (e.g., implement a
Sybil attack [8] at the MAC layer).
In this thesis, we demonstrate six attacks that are possible by an inside attacker in
a beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network. The inside attacker targets the vulnerabilities of the
beacon broadcast and the GTS management scheme. The contributions of this thesis include
the discovery of vulnerable properties of the beacon-enabled mode in the IEEE 802.15.4
standard and the implementation and analysis of six potential insider attacks associated
with those vulnerabilities. We also present an extension of MiniSec [9], beacon-enabled
MiniSec (BCN-MiniSec), to defend against these attacks and examine its cost.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. We review some related works including
several security protocols for WSNs and attacks on beacon-enabled IEEE 802.15.4 in Chapter
2. In Chapter 3, we briey illustrate the beacon broadcast and the GTS management scheme
and explain their vulnerabilities. In Chapter 4, we present the experiment design and show
the hardware and software components. In Chapter 5, we rst dene an attack model and
present an overview of the six attacks against the vulnerabilities. In Chapter 6, we describe
the implementation of the attacks. In Chapter 7, we show the analysis of each attack's results
based on the captured data. We present BCN-MiniSec to defend against these attacks in
Chapter 8 and conclude our work in Chapter 9.
3Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
In this chapter we categorize current 802.15.4 defense mechanisms into non beacon-
enabled mode and beacon-enabled mode according to the literature and highlight their lim-
itations. We also discuss the dierence between our attacks on beacon-enabled 802.15.4
networks and others previously demonstrated.
2.1 Defense Mechanisms in Beacon-Less Mode
In [10, 11], the authors propose using the received signal strength indication (RSSI) to
identify nodes conducting a Sybil attack. The basic idea of RSSI-based methods is that
sensor nodes at dierent locations can be dierentiated by the dierent RSSIs. In [10], M.
Demirbas et al. calculate the ratio of RSSIs to improve traditional RSSI-based solutions.
In [11], J. Yang et al. propose K-means cluster analysis that can be applied to RSSI readings.
However, RSSI-based solutions can be evaded by malicious nodes with mobility. Another ap-
proach to securing beacon-less 802.15.4 networks focuses on the use of cryptography. In [12]
the authors propose light-weight identity certicates to distinguish between legitimate nodes
and malicious nodes using multiple stolen or forged IDs, while the authors of [13{16] focus
on key distribution and management algorithms to provide this protection. However, it is
not practical for resource constrained sensor devices to use highly expensive key distribution
methods. Link layer security protocols constitute another category of defense mechanisms
for beacon-less 802.15.4 networks. SPINS, TinySec, and MiniSec [9, 17, 18] fall in this cat-
egory and are designed specically for energy constrained sensor nodes and provide data
4authentication and condentiality in the link layer. However, these protocols are susceptible
to failures when a malicious node in the network (e.g., a compromised node or a malicious
insider) acquires a shared pair-wise key or a network-wide secret key. Moreover, even if their
shortcomings are excluded, none of the aforementioned schemes can be directly applied to
beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks. This is because in addition to the data protection pro-
vided by the aforementioned schemes, beacon-enabled mode control messages (e.g., beacon
broadcasts from the PAN coordinator) must also be secured, and as pointed out by Perrig et
al. in [17], traditional data authentication techniques cannot be used to provide broadcast
beacon authentication.
2.2 Defense Mechanisms in Beacon-Enabled Mode
Few defense methods have been proposed for beacon-enabled mode. One RSSI-based
solution for beacon-enabled mode was proposed by F. Amini et al. in [19]. The authors
proposed an RSSI solution where they introduced the use of a disc number and a device ID.
However, if a malicious node is close enough to a legitimate node in the same PAN (i.e., an
inside attacker), its RSSI may be confused with the RSSI of the legitimate node. The IEEE
802.15.4 standard [20] also has built-in security mechanisms to provide data condentiality
and data authenticity. However, in [21], N. Sastry et al. point out that these security
mechanisms have vulnerabilities related to the initialization vector (IV) management, key
management, and integrity protection. Moreover, the security mechanism only guarantees
data authentication, not authentication for beacon broadcasts. Alim et al. introduce EAP-
Sens in [22], which provides entity authentication and key management to validate each
device ID with the extensible authentication protocol (EAP) [23] using EAP-generalized pre-
shared keys (EAP-GPSKs) [24]. However, EAP-Sens uses the built-in security mechanisms of
the 802.15.4 standard to secure the communication between nodes and the PAN coordinator,
which means that it has the same problems as the security mechanisms in the 802.15.4
standard. Overall, neither the aforementioned detection mechanisms nor secure link layer
protocols for the beacon-enabled mode are eective in the case of inside attackers.
52.3 Attacks on Beacon-Enabled 802.15.4 Networks
In [25], R. Sokullu et al. use ns-2 simulations to demonstrate GTS attacks on the
802.15.4 MAC, particularly in beacon-enabled mode. The GTS attacks were divided into
four dierent scenarios: One Intelligent Attacker (OIA), One Random Attacker (ORA), Two
Intelligent Attackers (TIAs), and Two Random Attackers (TRAs). Both the OIA and TIAs
scenarios target the maximum number of GTS slots assigned to one legitimate node. In
contrast, the ORA and TRAs scenarios attack just one randomly chosen GTS. The main
goal of the GTS attacks in [25] is to create collisions during the CFP to deny the use of GTSs.
In contrast, the six attacks that we present seek to exploit the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 MAC
by inducing scenarios of unfairness and exhaustion [26,27].
In addition to presenting dierent types of attacks compared to those discussed in [25],
we implemented our attacks on real devices (i.e., Tmote Sky motes) rather than in simulation.
This latter point is extremely important for 802.15.4 MAC layer attacks, because in addi-
tion to the challenge of accurately modeling physical layer interference, simulations do not
take into account constraints imposed by the hardware, operating system, and applications,
which can lead to simplied attack scenarios. This is especially pronounced in resource-
constrained devices (e.g., Tmote Sky motes). For example, to implement the Sybil attack
(at the MAC layer) in TinyOS, we modied the timer function of TinyOS (in TimerC.nc)
to make it multithreaded so each fake node could use an instance. Each instance now has to
compete internally (within TinyOS) to gain access to the node's resources (e.g., processor,
transceiver), making this attack much more dicult to conduct. This small, but noticeable
nuance is not present in simulation tools.
In [28] we introduced several attacks on the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network. This work
extends [28] with the addition of 3 new implemented attacks as well as the presentation of
BCN-MiniSec to defend against the attacks.
6Chapter 3
PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this chapter, we briey explain the beacon broadcast and the GTS management
scheme of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. Additionally, we state the vulnerabilities of these
schemes.
3.1 Beacon Broadcasts
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard [20] operating in beacon-enabled mode denes the su-
perframe (SF) that consists of a contention access period (CAP), a contention free period
(CFP), and an inactive period as shown in Figure 3.1. The active period of the CAP and
the CFP is divided into 16 timeslots during which the nodes in the network should syn-
chronize with and transmit data. The timeslots can be synchronized through beacons that
the personal area network (PAN) coordinator periodically transmits at intervals dened by
the macBeaconOrder value. Upon receiving the beacons, the nodes take the beacon order
(BO) and SF order (SO) from the SF specication eld in Figure 3.2 (b) and synchronize
the timeslot interval, SF duration (SD), and beacon interval (BI) to the SF of the PAN in
Figure 3.1.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Maximum 7 GTSs
CFPCAP
Beacon Beacon
BI=aBaseSuperframeDuration*2BO symbols (Superframe structure with Inactive period)
Inactive
SD=aBaseSuperframeDuration*2SO symbols (Active)
Figure 3.1. The superframe structure of beacon-enabled 802.15.4.
7Frame
Control
Seq. 
Number
Addressing field
Auxiliary 
Security 
Header
Superframe
Spec.
GTS field
Pending 
address
field
Beacon 
Payload
FCS
Octets
2 1 4 or 10 0, 5, 6, 10, or 14 2 variable variable variable
MAC Frame Header MAC Payload MAC Footer
GTS Specification GTS Direction GTS List
GTS Descriptor
Counter
Reserv
ed
GTS
Permit
GTS Direction 
Mask
Rese
rved
Bits
3 4 1 7 1
Device Short 
Address
GTS 
Starting 
Slot
GTS 
Length
16 4 4
Octets
1 0 or 1 variable
For node N in GTS List Subfield For other nodes 
in GTS List Subfield
…
24 24 24
(a) Beacon frame structure
(c) GTS field
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Beacon Order (BO)
Superframe Order 
(SO)
Final CAP Slot
Battery Life 
Extension (BLE)
Reserved
PAN 
coordinator
Association 
Permit
Bits
4 4 4 1 1 1 1
(b) Superframe Specification
Figure 3.2. The beacon frame structure of the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 in detail: (a) beacon
frame structure (b) SF specication structure, and (b) GTS eld structure in beacon frame.
3.2 Vulnerability of Beacon Broadcasts
Verication of the PAN coordinator: The two important values, BO and SO, can cause
the nodes to change their internal timers used for synchronization and transmitting messages.
However, when processing the beacons received, legitimate nodes do not authenticate the
beacons and cannot tell whether they really came from the PAN coordinator. The nodes only
conrm that the PAN ID in the packet is the same as the value used during bootstrapping
of the network. Thus, if a malicious node sends beacons with the same PAN ID, the nodes
process the malicious beacons the same as those from the PAN coordinator as shown in
Figure 3.3. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the data authentication of the standard does not
apply to beacon broadcasts.
3.3 GTS Management Scheme
The beacon frames contain the guaranteed timeslots (GTSs) information and directions
used by nodes to transmit data during the CFP. The structure of the beacon frame and the
8Malicious node
Legitimate node A
Legitimate node B
PAN coordinator
Beacons from the PAN coordinator
Beacons from the malicious node with the same PAN ID and
ID and different BO and SO
[PAN ID: 0x1234, ID: 0x0
BO 4, SO 2]
[PAN ID: 0x1234, ID: 0x0
BO 4, SO 2]
Re-synchronize BO 4, SO 2
after synchronizing BO 6, SO 3
Re-synchronize BO 4, SO 2
after synchronizing BO 6, SO 3
[PAN ID: 0x1234, ID: 0x0
BO 6, SO 3]
[PAN ID: 0x1234, ID: 0x0
BO 6, SO 3]
Figure 3.3. A malicious node impersonating the PAN coordinator and broadcasting false
BO and SO with the same PAN ID and the PAN coordinator's ID.
GTS eld are shown in Figure 3.2 (a) and (c) respectively.
As shown in Figure 3.1, the PAN coordinator denes that each SF can have a max-
imum of seven GTSs for the CFP other than aMinCAPLength in [20]. The GTSs must
be assigned to legitimate nodes issuing GTS allocation requests to the PAN coordinator.
Then, the assigned slots should be released by the PAN coordinator after receiving a GTS
deallocation request from the same legitimate node. We briey explain the normal GTS
allocation and deallocation processes below.
GTS Allocation: If a legitimate node has data to transmit, it generates a GTS allo-
cation request. The PAN coordinator will allocate an available GTS to the legitimate node,
and all subsequent beacon frames will contain the GTS descriptor dening the device ad-
dress, GTS slot and direction. Upon receiving the beacon with the GTS descriptor, the
legitimate node will schedule the pending packet to be transmitted at the allocated GTS.
The GTS allocation process is shown in Figure 3.4 (a).
GTS Deallocation: The GTS deallocation occurs after the GTS descriptor has been
9transmitted for aGTSDescPersistenceT ime beacons by the PAN coordinator or when the
legitimate node using the GTS sends an explicit GTS deallocation request. The GTS deal-
location process is shown in Figure 3.4 (b).
Figure 3.4. GTS allocation and deallocation procedure.
3.4 Vulnerabilities of GTS Management Scheme
The PAN coordinator manages a list of GTSs to control the network access during the
CFP. However, the GTS management scheme has the following vulnerabilities.
CAP Maintenance: According to the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, the PAN coordinator can
perform several preventative actions to keep aMinCAPLength. One of these actions is to
deallocate unused GTSs within every 2n SFs, where n is dened as either 2(8 macBeaconOrder)
(0  macBeaconOrder  8) or (9  macBeaconOrder  14). However, if a malicious node
keeps constantly sending either GTS requests or data at the assigned GTSs during the CFP,
10
the preventative action is ineective.
Verication of Sensor Nodes' IDs: In the 802.15.4 GTS management scheme, the
PAN coordinator manages the identities of legitimate nodes requesting one or more GTSs.
The PAN coordinator assigns GTSs to the nodes, deallocates the assigned slots, and avoids
duplicated GTS requests from the same legitimate node. However, as shown in Figure 3.5
the PAN coordinator only checks the sensor nodes' IDs (a short 2-octet address) and the
sequence number of the packets. Thus, a malicious node can easily evade the verication
process for sensor nodes' IDs by using new forged IDs or impersonating legitimate nodes in
the network.
Figure 3.5. A malicious node impersonating legitimate nodes A and B IDs.
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Chapter 4
EXPERIMENT DESIGN
In this chapter, we present a network design and hardware and software components
used for the experiments and implementation.
4.1 Network Design
In this thesis, we deploy wireless sensor nodes supporting the IEEE 802.15.4 standard
and its beacon-enabled mode. In general, the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network consists
of few groups of clusters. One cluster can be composed of one PAN coordinator and few
nodes. For the experiments, we arrange a small cluster that consists of one PAN coordinator
and three nodes including a malicious node. The PAN coordinator broadcasts beacons and
receives sensed data from the nodes. The nodes sense the temperature and humidity around
the experiment area and transmit the data to the PAN coordinator during the CAP or the
CFP. The nodes do not communicate with one another, but only with the PAN coordinator
(e.g., a unicast message transmission). Only four nodes were used because the open source
implementation used became unstable with more than four nodes in the network. However,
it is important to note that these attacks are independent of the number of nodes deployed
in the network.
4.2 Hardware and Software Components
We used four Tmote Sky motes [29] based on TelosB platform: one for PAN coordinator,
two for legitimate nodes, and one for the malicious node. In addition, we used the Texas In-
12
struments (TI) CC2420 Evaluation Board/Evaluation Module (EB/EM) [30] in conjunction
with the TI Chipcon packet snier [31] to capture and analyze packet trac in the network.
For the attack implementation, we used a 802.15.4 open source supporting a beacon-enabled
mode from Open-ZB [32]. In particular, we used the open source v1.2 in conjunction with
TinyOS v1.15 [33]. Figure 4.1 shows Tmote Sky motes and CC2420 EB/EM. Figure 4.2
shows examples of captured packets from the TI Chipcon packet snier.
CC2420 EB/EM
Tmote Sky motes
PAN coordinator
LN2
MN4
LN6
Figure 4.1. Tmote Sky motes and CC2420 EB/EM.
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Chapter 5
OVERVIEW OF ATTACKS
In this chapter, we introduce the attack model and illustrate the overview of the attacks
based on the model. We present a total of six attacks and categorize them according to the
characteristics of the attacks. Table 5.1 lists the attacks and their characteristics.
5.1 Attack Model
Similar to the threat models dened in [26] and [34], we assume that a malicious node
behaves badly as a mote-class, inside, and active attacker. We deploy one Tmote Sky mote
as a malicious node that has the same capabilities as the legitimate nodes. The malicious
node is located near legitimate nodes in the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network. The malicious
node listens to beacons from the PAN coordinator to get synchronization information of the
network and GTS (de)allocation requests from legitimate nodes in the passive phase. In the
active phase, since an authentication between legitimate nodes and the PAN coordinator
may not be present due to higher communication cost, it is easier for the malicious node to
impersonate either legitimate nodes or the PAN coordinator and to attack the vulnerabilities
of the beacon broadcasts and the GTS management scheme. Table 5.1 presents a summary
of the attacks and the vulnerabilities of the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 MAC.
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5.2 Impersonating Existing Identities in the PAN
In this category, we describe four attacks. The rst attack presented is the synchro-
nization attack. In this attacks, legitimate nodes are lead to synchronize their SF timeslots
with the manipulated beacons from the malicious node. The next two attacks block data
transmission from legitimate nodes in the PAN that want to gain GTSs and transmit time-
sensitive data in the slots. The fourth attack injects false sensed data into the trac stream
from the legitimate node to the PAN coordinator during the CFP.
5.2.1 Synchronization Attack
This attack inuences all the nodes in the network concurrently, whereas the other
attacks can aect only one or a few legitimate nodes. The malicious node rst impersonates
the PAN coordinator's ID and uses the same PAN ID as that of the PAN coordinator. The
malicious node manipulates two important parameters: BO and SO as shown in Figure 3.1.
To compete with the beacons from the PAN coordinator, the malicious node sets the BO
less than or equal to that of the PAN coordinator and the SO less than that of the PAN
coordinator. Figure 5.1 shows two dierent SF sequences. Figure 5.1 (b) has short SF
intervals, as compared to that of the legitimate coordinator (shown in Figure 5.1 (a)), due
to the smaller BO and SO. Thus, when the legitimate nodes process the beacons from both
the PAN coordinator and the malicious node, they synchronize their SF timeslots with the
manipulated BO and SO (e.g., 4 and 2 respectively) if the beacons from the malicious node
arrives immediately after those from the PAN coordinator.
SF 1 SF 2 SF n-1 SF n
SF 1 SF 2 SF n-1 SF n SF n+1 SF n+2
Time
(a)
(b)
...
...
Time
Figure 5.1. The SFs, (a) and (b), congured by the PAN coordinator and the malicious node
respectively. For example, the BO and SO of (a) are set to 6 and 4 respectively, and the BO
and SO of (b) are set to 4 and 2 respectively.
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5.2.2 DoS of Data Transmission
Impersonating a legitimate node: If a malicious node is in the transmission range
of the PAN coordinator, it is easily able to obtain the IDs of active legitimate nodes in the
PAN. The malicious node also knows whether or not a legitimate node tries to transmit its
sensed data during the CFP by looking at the GTS allocation requests or the beacons. In
this attack, the malicious node impersonates the active legitimate nodes in the PAN and
sends GTS deallocation requests using the legitimate nodes' IDs to the PAN coordinator.
Figure 5.2 (a) shows an example of this attack. While two legitimate nodes request GTS
allocation to transmit data in the next SF's CFP, the malicious node can terminate the
data transmissions of the legitimate nodes by sending a GTS deallocation request with
the legitimate nodes' IDs. Since the PAN coordinator receives the GTS deallocation request
while processing the GTS allocation from the legitimate nodes, it ignores the GTS allocation
coming rst and does not assign any GTS to the legitimate nodes. As a result, the legitimate
nodes that do not have any assigned GTS cannot transmit its sensed data.
CAP CFP CAP CFP CAP CFP CAP CFP
…
GTS allocation requests from legitimate nodes
GTS deallocation request from a malicious node
Beacon
Data from legitimate nodes
Time
(Blocked transmissions from legitimate nodes)
(a) By impersonating a legitimate node
(b) By impersonating the PAN coordinator
CAP CFP CAP CFP CAP CFP CAP CFP
…
Beacon from a malicious node
GTS allocation requests from legitimate nodes
Beacon
Data from legitimate nodes
Time
(Blocked transmissions from legitimate nodes)
…
Figure 5.2. A malicious node blocking a legitimate node sending data during CFP. (a)
represents that the malicious node pretends to be a legitimate node. (b) represents that the
malicious node pretends to be the PAN coordinator.
Impersonating the PAN coordinator: The previous attack impersonates the le-
gitimate nodes' IDs to cause the PAN coordinator to deallocate the GTSs. In this attack,
the malicious node impersonates the PAN coordinator and broadcasts manipulated beacons
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that do not include any GTS descriptor. When the legitimate nodes request GTS allocation
to transmit its sensed data, they wait for beacons coming with the GTS descriptors that
tell them the assigned GTS information (e.g., address, slot, and length as shown in Figure
3.2 (c)). If the beacons that the legitimate nodes receive do not have any GTS descriptor,
the nodes assume that they cannot transmit the sensed data to the PAN coordinator due
to no GTS being allocated. Thus, the malicious node impersonating the PAN coordinator
keeps sending a manipulated beacon without GTS descriptors right after the PAN coordina-
tor broadcasts a beacon with GTS descriptors. Since the legitimate nodes just process the
beacon coming last if there are more than one beacon received within the proper boundary
of the timeslot, it is told that no GTS is assigned by the manipulated beacons from the
malicious node coming last and is not transmitting data to the PAN coordinator as shown
in Figure 5.2 (b).
5.2.3 False Data Injection
In this attack, the malicious node identies which legitimate node has not requested
GTS allocation by looking at the GTS descriptors of beacons. Then, the malicious node
chooses the legitimate node's ID that does not have any GTS allocation request and sends a
GTS allocation request using that ID. After it conrms that a GTS is allocated by the PAN
coordinator, the malicious node sends false data with the ID to the PAN coordinator during
the CFP while the legitimate node sends its sensed data during the CAP. After checking
the node's ID, the PAN coordinator regards the false data as time-sensitive ones from the
node due to being sent during the CFP. Then, it can update with the false data sent by
the malicious node. Figure 5.3 shows how this attack works; for instance, when a legitimate
node is transmitting current temperature data during the CAP, the malicious node sends a
GTS allocation request with the spoofed ID, pretends to be another legitimate node, and
can inject false temperature data during the CFP.
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PAN coordinator
Legitimate node
Malicious node
CAP
CFP
CAP
CFP
SF N
SF N+1
...
Temperature: 77 °F
Temperature: 77 °F
…
Temperature: 28 °F
...
...
Temperature: 77 °F
Temperature: 77 °F
…
Temperature: 28 °F
…
Data from a legitimate node
False data from a malicious node
Received data on PAN coordinator
Figure 5.3. A malicious node sending false temperature to the PAN coordinator.
5.3 Impersonating Non-existing Identities in the PAN
In this category, a malicious node forges up to 7 dierent IDs depending on the maximum
number of available GTSs. The two attacks presented in this section perform exhaustion
and unfairness attacks by occupying all 7 GTSs and not allowing legitimate nodes to reserve
GTSs.
5.3.1 DoS of GTS Requests
To perform this attack, a malicious node continuously monitors the available GTS
slots with the intent of completely occupying them. Then, the attacker sends several GTS
allocation requests to ll up all the available GTSs in the SF. The advantage of this attack
is that the malicious node can reduce its energy consumption, because once it occupies all
7 GTSs, it does not need to send out any data or commands. The malicious node simply
dissects beacon frames to see if the PAN coordinator performs the preventative action for
the CAP maintenance. Figure 5.4 shows that after legitimate nodes A and B send GTS
deallocation requests, the malicious node completely lls all 7 GTSs with two additional
GTS allocation requests. The goal of this attack is not for the attacker to use the bandwidth
requested, rather it is to prevent the legitimate nodes from transmitting data during the CFP.
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Broadcasting beacon frames from the PAN coordinator
GTS allocation request from a malicious node
Legitimate node A
Legitimate node B
PAN coordinator
Malicious node
[GTS REQ: C, 1]
GTS deallocation request from legitimate nodes
[GTS REQ: A, 1]
[GTS REQ: B, 1]
1
2
3
4
(Total 7 GTS allocation requests)
[GTS REQ: D, 1]
[GTS REQ: E, 1]
[GTS REQ: F, 1]
[GTS REQ: G, 1]
[GTS REQ: H, 1]
[GTS REQ: I, 1]
Figure 5.4. A malicious node lling up all 7 GTSs. 1: the malicious node sends ve GTS
allocation requests. 2 and 3: legitimate node A and B send GTS deallocation requests. 4:
the malicious node sends the rest of GTS allocation requests.
5.3.2 Stealing Network Bandwidth
Similar to the DoS of GTS requests, in this attack, an attacker observes the GTS list in
order to eventually occupy the available GTS slots. However, in this attack, the malicious
node sends data at the assigned timeslots. The purpose of data transmission is to prevent
the PAN coordinator from dropping the assigned GTSs. As shown in Figure 5.5, the second
CFP has data transmitted from both legitimate nodes and a malicious node. However, since
legitimate nodes send GTS deallocation requests during the second CAP, the malicious node
sends a GTS allocation request to occupy the new free GTS. Eventually, only the malicious
node sends data during the fourth CFP. The timeslots will never be vacant during the CFP
of every SF, which can cause both exhaustion and unfairness against legitimate nodes. This
also aects the PAN coordinator who cannot go into sleep mode (denial of sleep attack [35])
due to the malicious node continuously sending data.
Figure 5.5. A malicious node stealing all 7 GTSs during CFP.
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Chapter 6
IMPLEMENTATION OF ATTACKS
In this chapter, we introduce the application layer and MAC layer modules that were
implemented to execute the six attacks described in the previous chapter. We explain in
detail how the malicious node runs the attacks in the PAN.
6.1 Attack Modules for Implementation
We have implemented our attacks based on the existing modules provided by Open-ZB.
Given the modules in the MAC layer of the 802.15.4 protocol, we mainly modied the source
code of MAC layer for our attacks and added a malicious application (MAC misbehavior
app) as shown in Figure 6.1. The modied MAC layer and the malicious application target
the vulnerabilities of the GTS management scheme described in Chapter 3.
We have two options for implementing the MAC misbehavior attacks: the rst option
is to implement a module in the application layer, while the second option relies on the
implementation of modules in the application and MAC layers. In the application layer
implementation, most operations of the attacks are controlled and executed in MAC misbe-
havior app. For instance, MAC misbehavior app calls MLME SET() to set existing IDs or
multiple non-existing faked IDs in the malicious node and callsMLME GTS request() inMal-
GTS management to send GTS (de)allocation requests with manipulated IDs as illustrated
in Figure 6.2. However, since MAC misbehavior app cannot determine the appropriate time
to send GTS (de)allocation requests or manipulated beacons without getting the information
from the MAC layer, it has to either send repeated GTS requests and beacons frequently or
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MAC misbehavior app
Others
….
Sensor module
for
Temperature, 
Humidity and 
Light
CC2420
Temperature/
Humidity sensor
Light sensor
LEDs
TimerAsync
MSP430 
Interrupt
Protocol Stack
MAC Layer module
802.15.4-Standard
w/ Beacon-Enabled
PHY Layer module
802.15.4 -Standard
Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL)
HPLCC2420 
module
Clock
Hardware Components on TmoteSky
ADC/I2C module
Figure 6.1. The software and hardware modules of the Tmote Sky mote. The software
modules consist of TinyOS v1.15 and the protocol stack of Open-ZB v1.2. The shaded
region represents the modied modules for the malicious node.
get triggered by the MAC layer to send them. Either way has high performance overhead
that can consume the battery of Tmote Sky mote due to high transmission frequency or
increased function calls between the application and MAC layers.
MAC misbehavior app
P
ro
to
co
l S
ta
ck
MAC Interface layer (MCPS SAP / MLME SAP) + Additional parameters
PHY Interface layer (PD SAP / PLME SAP)
PHY Layer
3. Call MLME_SET.request() with faked IDs
Call MLME_GTS.request()
Beacon 
management
MAC Layer
Mal-GTS 
management
2. Signal MLME_BEACON_NOTIFY.indication()
1. Signal PD_DATA.indication()5
4
Figure 6.2. The attacks implemented and controlled in the application layer.
For this reason, we implement the MAC misbehavior attacks by adding Mal-PD DATA
management in the MAC layer as shown in Figure 6.3. Mal-PD DATA management inter-
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cepts a function, PD DATA.indication(), which indicates all packets (e.g., beacon, command
(GTS request), data) of the communication in the PAN. Then, it directly executes the at-
tacks in the MAC layer. For instance, if the packet is a beacon from the PAN coordinator,
Mal-PD DATA management looks at available GTSs and directly calls Mal-GTS manage-
ment to ll all remaining GTSs. If the packet is a GTS allocation request from a legitimate
node, Mal-PD DATA management informs Mal-GTS management of the legitimate node's
ID. Then, Mal-GTS management sends a GTS deallocation request with the ID. This allows
our attacks to be more eciently executed with lower communication overhead.
MAC misbehavior app
MAC Interface layer (MCPS SAP / MLME SAP)
PHY Interface layer (PD SAP / PLME SAP)
PHY Layer
P
ro
to
co
l S
ta
ck
MAC Layer
1. Call MLME_SET.request() with faked ID
2. Signal PD_DATA.indication()
Mal-PD_DATA
management
5. PD_DATA.request() for GTS deallocation REQ
3. Signal MLME_BEACON_NOTIFY.indication()
to notify GTS deallocation requested
Mal-GTS 
management
4. mal_create_gts_request_cmd()
Figure 6.3. The attacks improved by implementing and controlling in the MAC layer with
the Mal-PD DATA management module.
6.2 Impersonating Existing Identities in the PAN
In this section, we assume that there is one PAN coordinator, two legitimate nodes (LN2
and LN6), and one malicious node (MN4) as shown in Figures 6.4-6.7. MN4 impersonates
the IDs of LN2, LN6, and the PAN coordinator by eavesdropping on the trac in the PAN.
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6.2.1 Synchronization Attack
In this attack, MN4 recognizes that the BO is 6 and the SO is 4. Next, it broadcasts
beacons with lower or equal value than the legitimate BO and SO (according to the notation,
0  SO  BO  14, in the 802.15.4 standard) until the manipulated beacons lead the node
to synchronize its SF timeslots using the BO and SO (e.g., 4 and 2 respectively) from MN4.
To prevent LN2 from dropping the manipulated beacons, MN4 should be careful to send the
rst beacon that could be processed within the boundary of the timeslot when LN2 processes
the beacon from the PAN coordinator. Thus, in the 3rd SF in Figure 6.4, the manipulated
beacon with BO = 4 and SO = 2 is sent right after MN4 receives the legitimate beacon from
the PAN coordinator. LN2 receives the legitimate beacon rst and the manipulated beacon
last before nishing the beacon process. Then, LN2 actually synchronizes its SF timeslots
with BO = 4 and SO = 2 in the 3rd SF. From the 3rd SF, LN2 can transmit its sensed data
to MN4 during the CFP that is provided by the MN4's SFs.
MN4 LN2
PAN
Coordinator
LN6
GTS Allocation REQ [LN2/1, SEQ:0x14]
DATA [LN2, SEQ: 0x15, D: 0xA0]
CAP
CFP
ACK [SEQ: 0x14]
ACK [SEQ: 0x15]
BEACON
1st SF
3rd SF
…
…
LN2 resets BO to 4 
and SO to 2 when 
processing the 
beacon received 
from MN4
Broadcasting BEACON [BO:6, SO:4] 
w/ GTS list [L:1, LN2/1]
Broadcasting BEACON [BO:6, SO:4] 
w/ GTS list [L:1, LN2/1]
Broadcasting BEACON [BO:4, SO:2] 
w/ GTS list [L:1, LN2/1]
DATA [LN2, SEQ: 0x16, 
D: 0xA0]
ACK [SEQ: 0x16]
2nd SF
…
BEACON
CFP
…
Figure 6.4. The sequence for synchronization attack.
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6.2.2 DoS of Data Transmission
Impersonating a legitimate node: As shown in Figure 6.5, this attack works through
two SFs. In the rst SF, LN2 and LN6 send GTS allocation requests to the PAN coordinator
to reserve one GTS. Then, MN4 immediately sends GTS deallocation requests with the
impersonated LN2 and LN6's IDs in the same CAP right after their GTS allocation requests.
The PAN coordinator removes LN2 and LN6 from the GTS list and does not receive data
during the CFP of the next SF. Since LN2 and LN6 are not allocated to GTSs, they are not
able to send their messages during the CFP.
MN4 LN2
PAN
Coordinator
LN6
GTS Allocation REQ [LN2/1, SEQ:0x50]
GTS Allocation REQ [LN6/1, SEQ: 0x12]
CAP
CFP
ACK [SEQ: 0x50]
ACK [SEQ: 0x12]
GTS  Deallocation REQ [LN2/1, SEQ:0x51]
ACK [SEQ:0x51]
GTS  Deallocation REQ [LN6/1, SEQ:0x13]
ACK [SEQ:0x13]
Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:0]
BEACON
1st SF
2nd SF
…
…
No GTS descriptor 
adds for LN2 and 
LN6
No GTS is assigned. 
LN2 cannot transmit 
data
No GTS is assigned. 
LN6 cannot transmit 
data
Figure 6.5. The sequence for DoS of data transmission by impersonating a legitimate node.
Impersonating the PAN coordinator: In this attack, MN4 uses the same values of
the BO and SO as the PAN coordinator (obtained by eavesdropping on the normal beacons
in the PAN). However, while LN2 requests GTS allocation and transmits its data at an
assigned GTS, MN4 broadcasts the manipulated beacons without GTS descriptors right
after receiving the beacons from the PAN coordinator in the 3rd SF as shown in Figure
6.6. LN2 processes the manipulated beacon that is received last. Since the beacon does not
include GTS descriptors, LN2 is not able to transmit its sensed data due to no available
GTS assigned.
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MN4 LN2
PAN
Coordinator
LN6
GTS Allocation REQ [LN2/1, SEQ:0x14]
DATA [LN2, SEQ: 0x15, D: 0xA0]
CAP
CFP
ACK [SEQ: 0x14]
ACK [SEQ: 0x15]
BEACON
1st SF
3rd SF
…
…
LN2 knows that no 
GTS is allocated 
when processing the 
beacon from MN4
Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:1, LN2/1]
Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:1, LN2/1]
Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:0]
2nd SF
…
BEACON
CFP
…
No DATA transmitting
Figure 6.6. The sequence for DoS of data transmission by impersonating the PAN
coordinator.
6.2.3 False Data Injection
Unlike DoS of data transmission, this attack exploits GTS allocation requests to trans-
mit false data. Figure 6.7 shows such a case where LN2 has already been assigned to one
GTS. In this case, MN4 starts after LN2 sends a GTS deallocation request in the rst SF.
Then, the PAN coordinator removes LN2's ID on the GTS list of the next beacon. Since
MN4 is aware that LN2 is not in the GTS list, it immediately tries to get one GTS by
sending a GTS allocation request with LN2's ID. Once MN4 successfully takes the GTS, it
starts sending false data with LN2's ID in the third SF.
6.3 Impersonating Non-existing Identities in the PAN
For forging non-existing IDs, we also have one PAN coordinator, two legitimate nodes
(LN2 and LN6), and one malicious node (MN4) that generates false IDs that are dierent
from LN2 and LN6. In this case, MN4 eavesdrops on the beacons to learn what IDs do not
belong in the PAN.
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MN4 LN2
PAN
Coordinator
LN6
GTS Deallocation REQ [LN2/1, SEQ:0x13]
DATA [LN2, SEQ: 0x12, D: 0xA0]
CFP
Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:1, LN6/1]
BEACON
ACK [SEQ: 0x13]
ACK [SEQ: 0x12]
GTS  Allocation REQ [LN2/1, SEQ:0x14]
ACK [SEQ:0x14]
ACK [SEQ:0x15]
CAP
Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:2, LN6/1, LN2/1]
BEACON
1st SF
2nd SF
…
…
…
MN4 knows that 
LN2 is not on the GTS list now.
…
DATA [LN2, SEQ:0x15, D: 0x10]
PAN coordinator 
indicates 
that an updated data, 
0x10, is sent from LN2
CFP
3rd SF
CAP
…
Previous
SF
Figure 6.7. The sequence for false data injection.
6.3.1 DoS of GTS Requests
As shown in Figure 6.8, this attack needs several SFs to allow MN4 to ll all 7 GTSs.
In each SF, MN4 knows how many GTSs are available and sends GTS allocation requests in
order to reserve the remaining slots of GTSs. Once MN4 takes all 7 GTSs, it stops sending
GTS allocation requests to reduce its energy consumption. It then monitors the beacons to
see if the PAN coordinator drops the unused GTSs by a preventative action for the CAP
maintenance. If this occurs, MN4 will start sending GTS allocation requests again.
6.3.2 Stealing Network Bandwidth
Figure 6.9 shows that a malicious node takes the last slot out of 7 GTSs, 6 slots of which
were already assigned to the malicious node. Then, it can consume all 7 GTSs during the
CFP to transmit data. The dierence from the previous DoS of GTS Requests is that since
this attack continues to transmit data at each timeslot of the CFP, the PAN coordinator
will not take any preventative action for the CAP maintenance.
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MN4 LN2
PAN
Coordinator
LN6
CAP
Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:2, LN2/1, LN6/1]
BEACON
GTS  Allocation REQ [LN3/1, SEQ:0x10]
1st SF
…
MN4 knows that 
5 slots are available now.
…
GTS  Allocation REQ [LN7/1, SEQ:0x50]
ACK [SEQ: 0x50]
…5 GTS 
Allocation 
REQs
GTS Deallocation REQ [LN2/1, SEQ:0x13]
ACK [SEQ: 0x13]
Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:6, LN6/1, LN3/1, LN4/1, LN5/1, LN6/1, LN7/1]
MN4 knows that 1 slot is available now 
because of LN2 deallocated.
GTS Deallocation REQ [LN6/1, SEQ: 0x12]
ACK [SEQ: 0x12]
BEACON
…
CAP
BEACON
MN4 knows that another 1 slot is available now 
because of LN6 deallocated.
GTS  Allocation REQ [LN8/1, SEQ:0x60]
ACK [SEQ: 0x60]
Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:6, LN3/1, LN4/1, LN5/1, LN6/1, LN7/1, LN8/1]
GTS  Allocation REQ [LN9/1, SEQ:0x70]
ACK [SEQ: 0x70]
Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:7, LN3/1, 
LN4/1, LN5/1, LN6/1, LN7/1, LN8/1, LN9/1] BEACON
…
…
CAP
…
2nd SF
3rd SF
4th SF
1 GTS 
Allocation
REQ
1 GTS 
Allocation
REQ
Figure 6.8. The sequence for DoS of GTS requests.
MN4 LN2
PAN
Coordinator
LN6
CFP
Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:2, LN2/1, LN6/1]
BEACON
1st SF
…
MN4 knows that 
5 slots are available now.
…
DATA [LN2, SEQ:0x13, D:0xA0]
ACK [SEQ: 0x13]
CAP
…
2nd SF
DATA [LN6, SEQ:0x61, D:0x23]
ACK [SEQ: 0x61]
GTS Deallocation REQ [LN2/1, SEQ:0x14]
ACK [SEQ: 0x14]
Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:1, LN6/1]
BEACON
GTS  Allocation REQ [LN3/1, SEQ:0x60]
ACK [SEQ: 0x60]
Broadcasting BEACON w/ GTS list [L:2, LN6/1, LN3/1]
BEACON
CAP
…
ACK [SEQ:0x15]
DATA [LN3, SEQ:0x15, D: 0x10]
3rd SF
4th SF
CFP
When any legitimate node leaves GTS list,
Sybil node will fill the list and send data
Figure 6.9. The sequence for stealing network bandwidth.
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Chapter 7
ATTACK ANALYSIS
We have veried our implementation with the TI packet snier [31] to monitor the
packet transmission while each attack is running. We employ the PAN coordinator to log
humidity and temperature data sent by a legitimate node during both the CAP and the CFP.
The throughput given in Figures 7.1, 7.2, and 7.4 are based on the total number of data in
bytes divided by the elapsed time. The total data is counted only during the CFP. For each
of the six attacks, we measured the packet transmission for 80 to 400 seconds depending on
the complexity of each attack.
7.1 Synchronization attack
Figure 7.1 shows that LN2 synchronizes its SFs with the legitimate PAN coordinator
broadcasting beacons (BO = 6, SO = 3) at rst. However, it resynchronizes the SFs with
MN4's beacons (BO = 4, SO = 2) around the 24-second mark. Figure 7.1 (a) illustrates
that while the data throughput of LN2 is increasing up to 15 bps, MN4 starts broadcasting
malicious beacons with BO (4) and SO (2) whereas the PAN coordinator broadcasts beacons
with BO (6) and SO (3). At this moment, the MN4's data throughput starts increasing
whereas the throughput to the PAN coordinator begins to decrease. The reason for lower
data throughput from the 24-second mark is that the additional beacons from the PAN
coordinator are still being sent within the shorter SFs of MN4, and LN2 transmits only 2
bytes in the SFs whereas it was previously sending more than 4 bytes in the SFs of the PAN
coordinator. We can dierentiate where the data is being transmitted from by checking the
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intervals between the rst beacons and the rst data packets in SFs. We measure the normal
intervals in two dierent SFs. In one SF set by BO (6) and SO (3), the interval between
the rst beacon and the data packet is about 250 ms as shown in Figure 7.1 (b). In the
other SF set by BO (4) and SO (2) of beacons, the interval is about 69 ms. Figure 7.1
(b) shows that the interval in the synchronization attack is reduced from about 250 ms to
about 69 ms around the 24-second mark, which is the same time mark that MN4 begins to
broadcast its fake beacons. As a result, LN2 perfectly synchronized the beacons with MN4
and transmitted data to MN4.
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Figure 7.1. Legitimate node (LN2) data throughput changes after synchronizing with
beacons from MN4. The intervals are between the rst beacon and the rst data packet in
SFs.
7.2 DoS of Data Transmission
Impersonating a legitimate node: Figure 7.2 (a) shows the decline of data throughput
on LN2 and LN6 while MN4 is sending GTS deallocation requests with LN2 and LN6's IDs.
Around the 50-second mark of the experiment, MN4 sends two GTS deallocation requests
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back to back. It also sends the same two GTS deallocation requests whenever it receives a
beacon-notication. Therefore, the data throughputs from LN2 and LN6 during the CFP
drops to 0bps. Immediately after the 50-second mark, even though LN2 and LN6 try to send
GTS allocation requests, the requests cannot be processed due to MN4 continuously sending
GTS deallocation requests. By modifying the MAC layer (as discussed in Section 6.1), MN4
only sends GTS deallocation requests right after LN2 requests GTS allocation (around the
52-second mark and the 85-second mark in Figure 7.2 (b)). This reduces the transmission
frequency of MN4 substantially. However, since the PAN coordinator only processes the last
GTS deallocation request, this leads to the same result of blocking data transmission (no
data transmission from the 50-second mark in Figure 7.2 (a) and (b)).
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Figure 7.2. Legitimate nodes (LN2 and LN6) data throughput during CFP by a malicious
node (MN4). LN2 DAT and LN6 DAT: Data from LN2 and LN6 and MN4 GTS: GTS
deallocation requests from MN4.
Impersonating the PAN coordinator: Figure 7.2 (c) shows that MN4 starts sending the
same beacons without GTS descriptors (i.e., no GTS assigned) around the 27-second mark,
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which immediately cripples LN2's throughput. Even though LN2 takes GTS information
with the PAN coordinator in few SFs from 34-second to 36-second and transmits some data,
it processes only the manipulated beacons from MN4 after around the 37-second mark.
Thus, LN2 does not transmit its sensed data (no data transmission from the 37-second
mark) because it assumes that no GTS is available due to the manipulated beacons without
GTS descriptors. By impersonating the PAN coordinator, we produce the same blocking of
data transmission as that shown in Figure 7.2 (a), (b), and (c).
7.3 False Data Injection
Figure 7.3 shows the change of humidity and temperature from LN2. We tested this
attack inside a building, where the humidity and temperature conditions were approximately
41% and 72F respectively. However, since MN4 impersonating LN2 sends false data readings
of 90% for the humidity and 28F for the temperature during the CFP, this results in
uctuations of the sensed data reported for 20 seconds around the 73 to 93-second mark.
Since 28F is below the freezing point, the false data of temperature might lead to a warning
sign in a practical situation.
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Figure 7.3. Fluctuation of humidity and temperature.
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7.4 DoS of GTS Requests
Figure 7.4 (a) shows two instances of the DoS GTS Request attack. LN2 and MN4 start
at the same time (around the 20-second mark). By sending a GTS request, LN2 quickly
occupies one GTS and transmits data during the CFP. Similarly, MN4 quickly occupies the
remaining 6 of the 7 GTSs. While LN2 is transmitting data, MN4 continuously sends GTS
allocation requests in an attempt to occupy the last GTS. Once LN2 releases its GTS at
the 50-second mark, the coordinator allows MN4 to occupy the last GTS. MN4 now stops
sending GTS allocation requests to conserve energy. LN2 sends a GTS allocation request
around the 60-second mark and the 90-second mark, but the coordinator does not assign
LN2 a GTS (because MN4 has them all). To see another iteration of this, we turn o the
PAN coordinator around the 130-second mark to force it to perform the preventative CAP
maintenance action manually (this is because the IEEE 802.15.4 source code from the Open-
ZB does not handle this situation as it should). Accordingly, the PAN coordinator does not
have any requested GTSs. Around the 140-second mark, we turn on the PAN coordinator
and LN2 successfully is allocated one GTS and it transmits data during the corresponding
CFP for about 70 seconds. MN4 now begins sending GTS allocation requests between the
150-second mark and 200-second mark and is able to occupy 6 GTSs. Also, when LN2
releases its GTS around the 200-second mark, MN4 immediately occupies all 7 GTSs again.
7.5 Stealing Network Bandwidth
Figure 7.4 (b) shows the data throughputs of LN2 and MN4 and the GTS allocation
requests of MN4. While LN2 has one GTS and transmits data during the CFP, MN4 starts
sending GTS allocation requests with 7 forged IDs around 20-second mark and transmits
data at the assigned GTSs. One of 7 GTS allocation requests of MN4 is discarded at the
rst attempt because one GTS is already assigned to LN2. However, as soon as LN2 releases
its GTS around the 50-second mark, MN4 occupies the last GTS immediately and has all
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Figure 7.4. A malicious node (MN4) lling up all 7 GTSs. LN2 DAT: LN2 Data, LN2 GTS
AL: LN2 GTS allocation request, LN2 GTS DE: LN2 GTS deallocation request, and MN4
GTS AL: GTS allocation requests from MN4. A malicious node (MN4) stealing GTSs during
CFP. LN2 DAT and MN4 DAT: Data from LN2 and MN4 respectively and MN4 GTS: GTS
allocation requests from MN4.
7 GTSs. As a result, LN2 and the PAN coordinator will use a lot of energy because LN2
continues to send GTS allocation requests to secure a GTS, and the PAN coordinator will
continue to receive the illegitimate data from MN4.
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Chapter 8
SECURING BEACON-ENABLED 802.15.4
In this chapter, we discuss which security requirements are necessary to defend against
attacks on beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks. As we demonstrated, attacks can be conducted
by impersonating both the PAN coordinator and legitimate regular nodes. The legitimate
regular nodes trusted forged beacons from a malicious node masquerading as the PAN coordi-
nator (e.g., synchronization attack and DoS of data transmission by impersonating the PAN
coordinator). The PAN coordinator also trusted forged data and control (GTS (de)allocation
requests) packets from malicious nodes masquerading as legitimate regular nodes (e.g., DoS
of data transmission by impersonating a legitimate node, DoS of GTS requests, false data
injection, and stealing network bandwidth).
To address the aforementioned attacks, we propose an enhanced MiniSec [9], called
beacon-enabled MiniSec (BCN-MiniSec), which satises the security requirements shown in
Table 8.1. BCN-MiniSec can guarantee unicast authentication and broadcast authentication
together in the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network. Unicast authentication is used for the PAN
coordinator to verify data and control messages. Given that MiniSec has low communication
cost for unicast data message authentication, we couple the techniques used by MiniSec with
lightweight authentication for unicast control messages in 802.15.4 beacon-enabled mode.
With unicast data message authentication, BCN-MiniSec can prevent a malicious node from
transmitting forged data messages. Since forged data messages are sent particularly at GTSs
for false data injection, it is also possible that BCN-MiniSec veries control messages (GTS
allocation requests) for indirect defense beforehand. Primarily, BCN-MiniSec adopts unicast
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control message authentication to defend against DoS of data transmission by impersonating
a legitimate node, DoS of GTS requests, and stealing network bandwidth that exploit forged
GTS (de)allocation requests. Further, we add broadcast authentication to secure the PAN
coordinator's broadcast messages. BCN-MiniSec adopts a one-way key chain for broadcast
authentication as done in other works [17] [36] and discloses a key of the key chain immedi-
ately with the beacons for real-time communications in the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network.
We explain each security requirement below to show how the individual requirement works
in the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network and can defend against the attacks.
Table 8.1. Security requirements to counter the attacks.
Attacks
Security requirements
Broadcast authentication Unicast authentication
Synchronization attack Y N
DoS of data
transmission
Impersonating a legit-
imate node
N Y
Impersonating the
PAN coordinator
Y N
False data injection N Y
DoS of GTS requests N Y
Stealingnetworkbandwidth N Y
8.1 Unicast control message authentication
In several of our attacks, a malicious node is able to send GTS (de)allocation requests
with forged IDs. This is possible because the PAN coordinator does not suciently authen-
ticate control messages (GTS requests). To prevent these attacks, unicast command frames
should be authenticated properly with a message authentication code (MAC) using a keyed
cryptographic hash function by the PAN coordinator. While BCN-MiniSec keeps MiniSec's
oset codebook (OCB) [37] to generates MACs and counters for unicast data messages,
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BCN-MiniSec instead adopts a cipher block chaining MAC (CBC-MAC) with the advanced
encryption standard (AES) to provide authentication with a 4-byte MAC and 1-byte ini-
tialization vector for unicast control messages. A number of MAC algorithms have been
proposed and adopted in many other communication protocols for lightweight authentica-
tion. One of them is the CBC-MAC that uses a block cipher to obtain a MAC for messages.
Since the CBC-MAC is able to process arbitrary length messages due to the block chaining
method and has reasonable performance for authentication with AES (due to a minimum
number of cipher function calls [38]), it is sucient for authentication of unicast control
messages. The steps for applying AES-CBC-MAC are as follows:
Key setup and nonce: Each legitimate node has its own secret key shared with the
PAN coordinator (KLNi, where i is f1; 2; :::; ng, the index of each legitimate node (LN) in
the PAN) before the nodes are deployed. For the nonce (that provides semantic security
and freshness), legitimate nodes also have their own initialization vectors (IVs) that can be
exposed either explicitly or implicitly (e.g., only part of the IV exposed) with the control
messages to the PAN coordinator. For instance, LNi has IVLNi t, where t is a sequence of
packets increasing in a timely fashion.
Transmitting control messages: Each legitimate node constructs its control messages
and transmits them as follows:
LN !PAN COR : CMDt
=MHRt; MSDUt; IVLNi t;
MAC(KLNi; MHRt jMSDUt j IVLNi t jLt)
Where LN stands for legitimate node, PANCOR stands for the PAN coordinator, and L
represents the length of the packet. CMDi is a command frame as shown in Figure 8.1 (b
y).
MHRt represents MAC header and MSDUt represents MAC service data unit as shown in
Figure 8.1.
Verifying control messages: The PAN coordinator decodes the MAC with KLNi of LNi
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and gets MHRt and IVLNi t. Then, it checks the integrity of MHRt and MSDUt and
authenticates LNi by KLNi. It also conrms the packet's freshness with IVLNi t.
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Figure 8.1. The packet formats of the 802.15.4 MAC with \no security" in (a) and (b) and
BCN-MiniSec in (ay) and (by). In (ay), Key disclosure represents a disclosed key in one-way
key chains. IV is an initialization vector. The shaded regions represent authenticated elds.
8.2 Broadcast authentication
BCN-MiniSec also provides broadcast authentication for beacons in the beacon-enabled
802.15.4 network. While unicast authentication can provide the PAN coordinator with the
trust of command and data frames that are transmitted from legitimate regular nodes, broad-
cast authentication is an ecient way to ensure the authenticity of the PAN coordinator's
beacon broadcasts. Unlike unicast command and data frames sent by regular nodes to a
single entity (i.e., the PAN coordinator), beacon frames are broadcast to all nodes in the
PAN. During broadcasts, the nodes share the same key as the PAN coordinator in a similar
fashion to unicast authentication. However, if this key is not dynamic, any legitimate node
can masquerade as the PAN coordinator. For this reason, BCN-MiniSec uses one-way key
chains [39] that use a one-way function to generate a sequence of keys. Many techniques
similar to one-way key chains have been proposed for many cryptographic applications and
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particularly for broadcast authentication [17] [36]. The one-way key chains are generated
by the PAN coordinator only, and the last key of the key chain is shared between the PAN
coordinator and the regular nodes. Then, the PAN coordinator discloses the previous key in
the key chain whenever it broadcasts beacons (i.e., one key per broadcast). The nodes can
then authenticate the beacons.
Key setup: The PAN coordinator generates a key chain (K0; K1; K2; :::; Kn 1; Kn) from
K0 by using a cryptographic hash function F . Thus, Kn = F (Kn 1 ), where n is the max-
imum number of keys (new keying material would be exchanged prior to n = 1 to continue
the secure communications). Then, Kn (i.e., the last key) is pre-shared between the PAN
coordinator and the nodes before they are deployed. Kn is used to secure the rst beacon.
Then, the next to the last key (Kn 1) is used with the second beacon. The pattern continues
and the PAN coordinator traverses the chain backwards, using the previous key in the chain
for the next transmission. The key expires after each transmission and the function that
generates the key is one way so nodes cannot masquerade as the PAN coordinator.
Broadcast beacons: The PAN coordinator sends beacons as follows:
LN  PAN COR : BCNn 1
=MHRn 1; Kn 1; MSDUn 1;
MAC(Kn 1; MHRn 1 jKn 1 jMSDUn 1)
Where n 1 is a sequence of the key chain and n is decremented by 1 after each transmission
while n > 0. BCNn 1 is a beacon as shown in Figure 8.1 (ay).
Verifying beacon: The nodes verifyKn 1 by using the hash function F . Kn = F (Kn 1 ),
where Kn is already veried in the previous beacon or trusted in the case of the initial key
disclosed pre-deployment. That is, the nodes receive the previous key in the chain and
assume that it is valid if its hash is the current key. Thus, using one-way key chains enables
the PAN coordinator to eciently provide authentication to its beacon broadcasts.
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8.3 BCN-MiniSec Communication Costs
In this section, we estimate the additional communication cost of BCN-MiniSec. Figure
8.1 (a) and (b) show beacon and command frames of the 802.15.4 standard. Figure 8.1 (ay)
and (by) illustrate the frames using BCN-MiniSec to show the modied elds and the frame
length. BCN-MiniSec adds Key Disclosure and MAC elds to regular beacons for broad-
cast authentication and IV and MAC elds to regular command frames for unicast control
message authentication. In addition, BCN-MiniSec uses the same packet format for unicast
data message authentication as that used by MiniSec.
Table 8.2 shows a summary of the communication costs of our countermeasure, BCN-
MiniSec, with its viability. In the table, we present the packet sizes (MHR;MSDU;MFR)
from our experiments (beacon frames, GTS command frames, and data frames). \No se-
curity" shows the packet sizes for each without any security applied and we compare the
increased overhead (communication cost) and viability of MiniSec, BCN-MiniSec, and \No
security." In beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks, BCN-MiniSec can prevent the synchroniza-
tion attack and DoS of data transmission by impersonating the PAN coordinator with 31.6%
overhead whereas MiniSec is not viable. Moreover, BCN-MiniSec requires 25% overhead to
secure unicast control messages (GTS (de)allocation requests) whereas MiniSec is not viable.
For unicast data message authentication, BCN-MiniSec requires the same 12.5% overhead
as that of MiniSec since BCN-MiniSec uses the same techniques for data message authen-
tication as those used by MiniSec. Thus, BCN-MiniSec is viable to defend against attacks
on the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 MAC with reasonable overhead. It must be noted that the
storage costs for the hash chain for broadcast authentication and keying material for unicast
authentication have not been considered.
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Table 8.2. The viability and communication cost of BCN-MiniSec. 1 MAC is message authentication code in this table.
Attacks Security Viability
Communication cost (B)
Increase over
no security
MHR MSDU
MFR
(+MAC1)
Security
overhead
Total
Synchronization attack
DoS of data transmission
-. Impersonating the PAN
coordinator
No security
(beacon)
N 10 26 2 - 38 -
MiniSec N - - - - - -
BCN-MiniSec Y 10 36 4 12 50 31.6%
DoS of data transmission
-. Impersonating a legitimate node
DoS of GTS requests
Stealing network bandwidth
No security
(GTS request)
N 8 2 2 - 12 -
MiniSec N - - - - - -
BCN-MiniSec Y 8 3 4 3 15 25%
False data injection
No security
(data)
N 12 2 2 - 16 -
MiniSec Y 12 2 4 2 18 12.5%
BCN-MiniSec Y 12 2 4 2 18 12.5%
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Chapter 9
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we rst described the existing vulnerabilities of the beacon broadcast
and the GTS management scheme in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. We also investigated
security protocols proposed in recent years and security mechanisms adopted in the standard.
However, to date, no method comprehensively addresses the weakness of the beacon-enabled
802.15.4 MAC. To demonstrate the vulnerabilities in the 802.15.4 MAC, we implemented
six attacks: (1) Synchronization attack, (2) DoS of data transmission by impersonating a
legitimate node, (3) DoS of data transmission by impersonating the PAN coordinator, (4)
False data injection, (5) DoS of GTS requests, and (6) Stealing network bandwidth. We also
analyzed the results for each attack and designed a countermeasure, BCN-MiniSec. Future
work will provide a detailed energy measurement of our attacks.
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